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Abstract The contribution of Lotfi Zadeh to the development of fuzzy logic goes far beyond the
introduction of the seminal concept of a fuzzy set, and has multiple facets. This article, as a small tribute
to the corpus of ideas, notions and results brought together over almost five decades by Zadeh, singles
out and illustrates two of his most stimulating, thought-provoking and fruitful creations: fuzzy rules, on
the one hand, and possibility theory, on the other. Indeed, the modeling of conditional statements of the
form, ‘‘if x is A, then y is B’’, plays a crucial role in any attempt at formalizing human reasoning. Starting
from the expression of different forms of fuzzy rules that have been identified in the setting of possibility
theory, we study their counterparts in the extensions of possibilistic logic. A distinction between rules
andmeta-rules is especially emphasized in the representational setting of possibility theory. It amounts to
viewing rules as pieces of knowledge that contribute to the partial specification of a unique epistemic state,
whilemeta-rules characterize constraints between specified epistemic states, as in possibilistic answer set
programming.
© 2011 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. General introduction
Among the tremendous amount of contributions and ideas
proposed and developed by Lotfi Zadeh over 45 years in the
framework of fuzzy logic, we would like to pinpoint three very
important pieces that have been especially influential on our
own work: the notion of fuzzy rules [1], the new setting of
possibility theory for modeling epistemic uncertainty [2], and
its application to knowledge representation and approximate
reasoning [3,4]. After being controversial for some time, the
idea of fuzzy sets has finally been acknowledgedworldwide as a
simple and powerful tool in information modeling. It has been
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.extremely successful in automatic control applications where
fuzzy rules are used as a way to easily implement interpolation
mechanisms, and as universal approximators of control laws.
Zadeh has also been continuously interested in Artificial
Intelligence (AI) throughout his career, and this interest can be
traced back as early as 1950 [5]. However, Zadeh’s contribution
to knowledge representation and approximate reasoning has
remained less widely known, in spite of (or because of) its
novelty since its proposal in the late seventies. Indeed, the idea
of representing pieces of information by means of possibility
distributions, and of computing the results of inferences by the
combination and projection of these distributions (in complete
agreement with possibility theory) may be regarded as a
breakthrough that anticipated many other works in AI, ranging
from constraint satisfaction problems to uncertainty networks.
Even if Zadeh’s proposal was mainly stated at the semantic
level, it is sufficiently rich to include, as particular cases,
possibilistic logic [6–8] which corresponds to the encoding
of uncertain crisp propositions, as well as extreme cases of
completely informed situations described by fuzzy propositions
in a multiple-valued logic [9].
Many of our contributions to AI, e.g. [6,10–13], have thus not
just been influenced by Zadeh’s pioneeringworks, but in fact are
deeply rooted in the setting of possibility theory that we have
further developed and/or applied to new problems. Moreover,
we are clearly indebted to Zadeh’s contributions not only for
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conventional views for approaching problems. In the following,
we focus the discussions on fuzzy rules, a topic that may be
found emblematic of Zadeh’s proposals, showing that some
fresh meat can be still offered on this old topic, in relation to
present concerns in logic programming.
2. Fuzzy rules
Conditional statements play a very important role in the
expression of knowledge. Fuzzy conditional statements, viewed
as expressions of the form ‘‘if A, then B’’, where A and B
have fuzzy meanings, have been considered rather early in
the development of fuzzy logic. They were introduced in a
famous seminal paper [1] by Zadeh, which is at the basis of the
blossoming of fuzzy rule-based control and decision systems.
Interestingly enough, Zadeh’s view of fuzzy rules [14,15] has
its roots in the idea of a fuzzy graph as a way of describing
(input, output) pairs in a fuzzily described system [16,17]. Such
a fuzzy graph, associatedwith a fuzzymapping, ismade of fuzzy
points (A, B) that can be read as a fuzzy rule ‘‘if A, then B’’. Fuzzy
points lead to the conjunctive view of fuzzy rules, in terms of
fuzzy Cartesian products A × B, put to work by Mamdani and
Assilian [18]’s fuzzy controllers and their numerous followers.
However, it is worth noticing that fuzzy conditional statements
in [1] are discussed in terms of a material implication linking
A and B. But the conjunctive and implicative views are there
‘‘reconciliated’’ by understanding A → B (where A and B are
defined on domains U and V , respectively, and + denotes a
disjunction) as A × B + ¬A × V , i.e. the model of the rule
is on the one hand equivalent to a pair of fuzzy points, but
on the other gives birth to the multiple-valued implication
max(min(a, b), 1− a), or to Dienes’ implication max(b, 1− a)
when replacing A×B byU×B in the previous expression, which
leads to U × B+¬A× V (i.e. either one has B or not A) [1].
This ambiguous nature of if–then rules, whether fuzzy or
not, can be related to what is often termed as ‘‘paradoxes of
implication’’, noticed for a long time. Indeed, in propositional
logic, material implication A → B imposes joint conditions
on the truth of A and B, without really conveying any sense of
necessity or relevance [19] in the so-established link between
A and B (especially when A is false). This has led to many
theoretical developments that address this problem in different
ways: modal logic, conditional logic, fuzzy logic and logic
programming, to name only the most visible.
Artificial intelligence has contributed to the emergence
of the idea of a state of knowledge (or epistemic state) as
a representation of what an agent could know about the
world in given circumstances, see, e.g. [20]. The framework of
possibility theory [2] is particularly well-suited for a graded
representation of such incomplete states of information, where
it is generally useful to rank-order the possible values of n-
tuples of variables describing the state of the world according
to their level of plausibility. Indeed, the idea of a possibility
distribution as an elastic constraint restricting the possible
values of a variable, introduced by Zadeh [2], is a key tool
for representing incomplete states of information and fuzzy
granules of knowledge. Zadeh [21] has further investigated the
idea of using constraints as an information representation tool.
For years, researchers in possibility theory and fuzzy set
theory have been interested in the proper modeling of if–then
rules. This has led to the identification of different types of
rule that involve the gradual nature of the properties and/or
the uncertainty of the conclusions. As a result, a synthesishas finally emerged [22], which, within the framework of
possibility theory, contrasts two types of modeling for rules,
either at ‘‘object’’ or ‘‘meta’’ levels. In this article, we reconsider
this distinction, showing its interest and its counterpart in
possibilistic logic [6–8].
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide the
necessary background regarding possibility theory, highlight-
ing the four sets of functions associatedwith a possibility distri-
bution and their role in the specification of these distributions.
Then, we discuss the modeling of if–then rules in the frame-
work of possibility theory; recalling the origin of ‘‘conjunctive’’
and ‘‘implicative’’models, and stressing thedistinctionbetween
‘‘object’’ and ‘‘meta’’ points of view in the modeling of rules,
which is a key issue in understanding the different approaches.
The next section explains how possibilistic logic can be gener-
alized, so as to take into account the two points of view, and we
discuss the consequences for inference. Finally,we conclude the
article by showing the importance of the distinction between
rules and meta-rules for a better understanding of possibilistic
logic programming.
3. Basics of possibility theory
This section provides a short background on possibility the-
ory, starting with the basic notion of a possibility distribu-
tion [2], recalling how events can be estimated on this basis by
means of different ‘‘measures’’, and discussing how a possibility
distribution can be indirectly specified through thesemeasures.
3.1. Possibility distribution and associated measures
Given a universe of discourse,U , a possibility distribution [2]
π is a function from U to [0, 1] that restricts the more or less
possible values for a ‘‘state’’ whose exact value is ill-known. This
state may be a quantity, x, with values in U , or the true unique
state of an incompletely described world. Then, π(u) = 0
expresses that value u is impossible for this ill-known quantity
(or state), and u is all the more possible as a value of this
quantity, as π(u) is large and close to 1.
Given a subset A inU , four set functions can be defined in the
framework of possibility theory, namely ∀A ⊆ U:
– a (weak) possibility measure [2]:
Π(A) = sup
u∈A
π(u).
It estimates the compatibility/consistency of having A true
(i.e. one of the elements of A is the true value) with the
state of knowledge represented by π ; this may be seen as
a measure of potential possibility;
– a dual measure of (strong) necessity [23]:
N(A) = 1−Π(Ac) = inf
u∉A 1− π(u).
It echoes the impossibility of the values outsideA (Ac denotes
the complement of A) or, equivalently, the inference of A
from π and, thus, reflects an actual necessity;
– a (strong) measure of (actual) possibility [24]:
∆(A) = inf
u∈Aπ(u).
It expresses to what extent all values in A have a minimal
(guaranteed) level of possibility; this may be seen as a mea-
sure of actual possibility;
– a dual measure of (weak) necessity [24]:
∇(A) = 1−∆(Ac) = sup
u∉A
1− π(u).
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sible value outside A; as such, this is a measure of potential
necessity.
These measures are related together by the weak consis-
tency constraint:
∀A ⊆ U, max(N(A),∆(A)) ≤ min(Π(A),∇(A)).
It holds if ∃u∗ ∈ U, π(u∗) = 1 and ∃u∗ ∈ U, π(u∗) = 0 (in
other words, if the possibility distribution is consistent and
strictly informative).
3.2. Specification of a possibility distribution
A possibility distribution, π , is often only partially specified
through constraints stating upper and lower bounds, respec-
tively, under the form π ≤ G and F ≤ π , where F and G can be
seen as the characteristic functions of fuzzy sets. (A subset and
its characteristic function are denoted in the same way.) Let us
notice thatΠ and N can still be used in a non-trivial way when
one only knows that π ≤ G (since Π and N are increasing in
the broad sense, with respect to set inclusion), while ∆ and ∇
are still appropriate, if it is only known that F ≤ π (indeed ∆
and ∇ are decreasing).
Clearly, in case of multiple restrictions Gi, we get π ≤
mini Gi, i.e. any information of this kind can only decrease the
degrees of potential possibility, while we have maxj Fj ≤ π ,
which on the contrary leads to an increase in the degrees of
actual possibility.
In the following, we only consider possibility distributions
with a finite number of possibility degrees for the sake of
simplicity:
a1 = 1 > a2 · · · > an+1 = 0,
where n ≥ 1.
Moreover, these degrees are supposed to be chosen such that
1 − aj = an−j+2, which expresses that complementation is an
internal operation on this scale.
Let ai(π) = {u|π(u) ≥ ai} be the cut of level ai of π . Then,
the distribution, π , can be decomposed under the form of the
weighted disjunction of its n level cuts:
π(u) = max
i=1,n
min(ai(π)(u), ai).
As well as a weighted conjunction:
π(u) = min
j=1,nmax(aj(π)(u), aj+1).
Thus possibility distribution π can be specified in terms of
a finite number of level cuts, according to the following
expressions:
∀i = 1, n,∀u,min(Fi(u), ai) ≤ π(u)⇔ ∆(Fi) ≥ ai;
∀j = 1, n,∀u, π(u) ≤ max(Gj(u), aj+1)
⇔ N(Gj) ≥ 1− aj+1.
When the fuzzy statement ‘‘x is G’’ is understood as the fact
that the possibility distribution, πx, representing this piece of
information should satisfy the constraint πx ≤ G, choosing a
particular distribution,πx, such thatπx < Gwouldbe arbitrarily
too precise. This leads to taking πx equal to the characteristic
function of G. This is the minimal specificity principle [23].
Similarly, in the case of a constraint of the form F ≤ πx, one
is led to take πx equal to F (at least if F ⊆ G), thus applying a
maximal specificity principle.
If we now consider negative statements, such as ‘‘x is not F ’’,
they can be understood in two different ways:– either as ‘‘x is (not F )’’, i.e. πx ≤ F c , with F c(u) = 1− F(u).
– or as ‘‘x (is not) F ’’ (that is ‘‘x is F ’’ is not true), leading to:
not(πx ≤ F)⇔ ∃u, πx(u) > F(u).
These two interpretations coincide only if the value of x is
precisely known, i.e. if πx is equal to 1 for a unique value (and is
0 elsewhere).
4. Representations of if–then rules in possibility theory
This section first recalls the conjunctive and implicative
modelings of a rule [25], prior to distinguishing between
‘‘object’’ and ‘‘meta’’ points of view.
4.1. A first dichotomy: conjunction v.s. implication
Let us consider a rule of the form ‘‘if x ∈ A, then y ∈ B’’, where
x and y are two quantities taking their values, respectively, on
domains U and V , where A and B are subsets of U and V . Let us
first examine the case where A and B are ordinary subsets.
A and B non fuzzy. The partial description offered by a rulemay
be understood in two different ways: either one insists on what
is positively asserted (namely that, when x ∈ A, any value in
B is eligible for y), or in an implicitly negative way (the values
outside B are excluded when x ∈ A):
– (x, y) ∈ A× B is guaranteed to be possible,
– (x, y) ∈ A× Bc is guaranteed to be impossible.
Since nothing is said for the situations where x ∈ Ac , if πx,y de-
notes the possibility distribution restricting the possible values
of the pair (x, y), we have, respectively:
– for the conjunction-based model (positive reading):
A× B ≤ πx,y, (1)
which leads to the conjunctive representation:
π∗(x,y)(u, v) = 1, if (u, v) ∈ A× B,
andπ∗(x,y)(u, v) = 0, otherwise (since nothing is said for the
other values).
As may be expected, we have, for all π ≥ π∗:
∆(A× B) = 1. (2)
Since, when A(u) = 1, we have π∗(x,y)(u, v) = 1, if v ∈ B,
Relation 1 is equivalent to:
A(u) ≤ inf
v∈Bπ∗(x,y)(u, v) = ∆∗({u} × B), (3)
i.e. if A is true (for x = u), B is indeed guaranteed to be
possible. By symmetry, Relation 1 is equivalent to:
B(v) ≤ inf
u∈Aπ∗(x,y)(u, v)
= inf
u∈U max(1− A(u), π∗(x,y)(u, v)), (4)
which corresponds to the proper inference mode fromwhat
is guaranteed to be possible (see [26] for details).
– for the implication-based model (negative reading):
π(x,y) ≤ (A× Bc)c = Ac + B, (5)
which expresses that:
π∗(x,y)(u, v) = 0, if (u, v) ∈ A× Bc,
and π∗(x,y)(u, v) = 1, otherwise (since the other values are
not restricted).
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N(Ac + B) = 1. (6)
Besides, Eq. (5) is equivalent to:
A(u) ≤ inf
v∉B 1− π
∗
(x,y)(u, v) = N∗({u} × B), (7)
i.e. if A is true (for x = u), y ∈ B is certain.
Moreover, Eq. (5) is equivalent to:
sup
u∈U
min(A(u), π∗(x,y)(u, v)) ≤ B(v), (8)
which is the counterpart of the classical inference: from
a state of knowledge including the (implicative) represen-
tation of the rule, and the one of A is true, one indeed
deduces that B is true. The inference machinery at work in
Relation 8 is Zadeh’s combination/projection principle [4], or
more simply, here, what is also called the compositional rule
of inference together with the entailment principle, which
are at the basis of his theory of approximate reasoning.
We, thus, have two possible views of a rule ‘‘if A then
B’’, leading to a representation of its epistemic contents that
associates A and B under the form of either an implicative
relation π∗, which is minimally specific, or as a conjunctive
relation, π∗, which is maximally specific. It corresponds to
a bipolar view of a rule [27], the positive side focusing
on examples characterized by the conjunction of antecedent
and consequent, and the negative side focusing on counter-
examples characterized by the complement of the material
implication.
Remark. When A and B are fuzzy, Relation 1 and Eq. (5)
can be extended in different ways according to the choice
of conjunction × or of the implication for Eq. (5), leading
to six types of rules [22], where the level cuts of A and
B are associated in different ways. Namely, depending on
whether the implication A → B is modeled by a strong
implication (as Dienes’), a residuated implication (as Gödel’s)
or its contrapositive, we get a certainty rule, a gradual rule or
an impossibility rule. Depending on whether for modeling× in
A× Bwe use a triangular norm (for example the minimum), or
the right or the left adjoint of a residuated implication, we get
a (guaranteed) possibility rule or two types of ‘‘anti-gradual’’
rules. More details are in [22,25].
4.2. A second dichotomy: Rules vs. meta-rules
As already said in the previous approach, in the case where
the possibility distributions are viewed as restrictions on pos-
sible values [2], the inference is governed by the combination
/ projection principle [4], as is clear in Relation 8. However,
some works have considered the inference process directly at
the meta level by directly specifying πy, as soon as the condi-
tion part of the rule is satisfied. This idea has been studied in
particular by Esteva et al. [28] (see also [22]); it also underlies
the ‘‘compatibility-modification inference’’ proposed by Cross
and Sudkamp [29].
Apart from the bipolar relational view of an if–then rule
just recalled, we may indeed see the rule ‘‘if x is A, then y
is B’’ as the specification of a link between constraints on
the possibility distributions, πx and πy, which describe states
of knowledge about quantities x and y, respectively [22].
Rules of this latter type are called meta-rules, as they encoderelationships between different epistemic states at the meta-
level, rather than relationships between possible values at the
object level. Each of the two components of the rulemaybe then
interpreted as, for instance, πx ≤ A and πy ≤ B (by modeling ‘x
is A’ and ‘y is B’ by restrictions on the possible values of x and y).
This leads to see the rule as a crisp ‘production’ rule of the form:
if πx ≤ A, then πy ≤ B, (9)
which can also be interpreted in terms of necessity measures,
as:
if Nx(A) = 1, then Ny(B) = 1, (10)
i.e. ‘‘if A is certain, then B is certain’’, where Nx and
Ny are necessity measures associated with the possibility
distributions, πx and πy, respectively.
Obviously, the statement ‘‘if x is A, then y is B’’ understood in
this way is logically equivalent in classical logic to ‘‘not (x is A)
or y is B’’, i.e.,
not(πx ≤ A) or πy ≤ B.
A second type of meta-rule results from the observation that,
apart from not(πx ≤ A) understood as ∃u, πx(u) > A(u), there
exists another interpretation of negation that corresponds to
πx ≤ 1− A.
Then, if we consider the statement ‘‘(x is Ac) or y is B’’,
i.e. πx ≤ 1 − A or πy ≤ B, one sees that it may be rewritten
under the form:
if not(πx ≤ Ac), then πy ≤ B.
The latter, when A and B are ordinary subsets, may be read in
terms of a Boolean possibility measure, since then:
not(πx ≤ Ac) ⇔ not(Nx(Ac) = 1)⇔ Nx(Ac) = 0
⇔ Πx(A) = 1.
This gives birth to a new kind of rule of the form:
if Πx(A) = 1, then Ny(B) = 1, (11)
i.e. ‘‘if A is possible, then B is certain’’.
Note that since πx,y ≤ πx ≤ 1 − A or πx,y ≤ πy ≤ B
(indeed, by definition, πx(u) = supv πx,y(u, v) ≥ πx,y(u, v),
and πy(v) = supu πx,y(u, v) ≥ πx,y(u, v)) entails πx,y ≤
max(1 − A, B), Eq. (11) is stronger than Relation 5, and since
πx ≤ 1−A entails not(πx ≤ A), assuming that πx is normalized,
Eq. (11) is also stronger than Relation 9.
In a similarway, two other ‘production’ rules can be defined:
– under the form:
if πx ≥ A, then πy ≥ B, (12)
corresponding to:
if ∆x(A) = 1, then ∆y(B) = 1, (13)
i.e. if A is actually possible, B is too;
– and under the form:
if ∇x(A) = 1, then ∆y(B) = 1, (14)
i.e. ‘‘if some values outside A are impossible, then B is
guaranteed to be possible’’.
5. Rules and meta-rules in possibilistic logic
We now study the counterpart of these rules, in a graded
version, in the setting of possibilistic logic. We start with a brief
reminder on possibilistic logic, aweighted extension of classical
logic, where the weights are handled using possibility theory.
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A formula in standard possibilistic logic [6,7] is a pair (p,
a), where p is a classical logic proposition, and a is its level of
certainty. It is semantically interpreted under the form of the
constraint, N(p) ≥ a (⇔ Π(¬p) ≤ 1 − a), and is associated
with the possibility distribution:
π(p,a)(s) = max(⟨p⟩(s), 1− a),
where ⟨p⟩(s) = 1 if s is a model of p (i.e. an interpretation that
makes p true) and ⟨p⟩(s) = 0, otherwise (the interpretations
that make p false are possible (at most) at degree 1− a).
Inference is based on the cut rule :
(¬p ∨ q, a); (p ∨ r, b) |H (q ∨ r,min(a, b)).
Note that themodus ponens instance of this rule, namely, (¬p∨
q, a); (p, b) |H (q,min(a, b)), is in complete agreementwith the
compositional rule of inference. Namely, it reads semantically:
min(π(p,b)(s), π(¬p∨q,a)(s)) ≤ π(q,min(a,b))(s),
i.e.:
min(max(⟨p⟩(s), 1− b),
max(1− ⟨p⟩(s), ⟨q⟩(s), 1− a)))
≤ max(⟨q⟩(s), 1−min(a, b)),
which is an instance of:
sup
u
min(πx(u), πx,y(u, v)) ≤ πy(v),
with πx representing ‘‘x is ⟨p⟩ is b-certain’’, πx,y representing
‘‘(if x is ⟨p⟩, then y is ⟨q⟩) is a-certain’’, and πy representing
‘‘y is ⟨q⟩ is min(a, b)-certain’’. In the same spirit, in a research
note, Zadeh [30] has pointed out the parallel between the
compositional rule of inference and a counterpart of Prolog,
where expressions are associated with certainty weights equal
to 1. See also [9] for related discussions.
Besides, there also exists a logic in terms of guaranteed
(actual) possibility [8] with formulas of the form [p, a], where p
is a proposition, and a is its guaranteed possibility level. This
corresponds semantically to the constraint ∆(p) ≥ a (⇔
∇(¬p) ≤ 1 − a), and is associated with the possibility
distribution:
π[p,a](s) = min(⟨p⟩(s), a).
The corresponding inference is based on the rule:
[¬p ∧ q, a]; [p ∧ r, b] |H [q ∧ r,min(a, b)].
In order to generalize Eq. (10), for example, one should express
that N(p) ≥ a ⇒ N(q) ≥ a. But note that even by enforcing
a < b in the pair of formulas (p, a), (q, b), possibilistic logic
does not enable us to express the above implication. One may
also enforce the condition N(q) ≥ N(p) which would be
even stronger than the above implication ⇒. This latter type
of information has already been considered in [31]. Similarly,
{[p, a], [q, b]}, with a < b, does not express that ∆(p) ≥ a ⇒
∆(q) ≥ b. We are going to see how such relationships can be
expressed in generalized possibilistic logic.
5.2. Generalized possibilistic logic
We may now consider the counterpart of rules, such as
Eq. (10). Formulas in possibilistic logic may be linked by only
one connective, the conjunction. Indeed, the possibilistic logic
base, {(p, a), (q, b)}, is equivalent to the conjunction (p, a) ∧
(q, b), which allows us to work in a clausal form. This is becauseN(p) ≥ a ∧ N(q) ≥ b is semantically equivalent to the
possibility distribution:
π(s) = min(max(⟨p⟩(s), 1− a),
max(⟨q⟩(s), 1− b)),
in standard possibilistic logic. The formula (p, a) ∨ (q, b),
which semantically corresponds to a set of two possibility
distributions, π(p,a) and π(q,b), should be understood at a meta-
level, with respect to one of the two elementary formulas that
constitute it. This expresses the disjunctive constraint:
N(p) ≥ a or N(q) ≥ b.
In the same way,¬(p, a) expresses that it is false that N(p) ≥ a
and thusN(p) < a. Onemay thus apply classical logic inference
at the meta level to such formulas, as already suggested in [32].
Thus if we have the knowledge base, K = {¬(p, a) ∨ (q, a),
(p, a)}, one can deduce (q, a), which is in accordance with the
intuition that the epistemic state (q, a) can be produced, once
the epistemic state (p, a) is established, given the meta-rule
¬(p, a) ∨ (q, a).
It is interesting to observe that while formula (¬p ∨ q, a)
enables us to deduce both (q, a) if one has (p, a), and (¬p, a) if
one has (¬q, a), the meta-formula¬(p, a) ∨ (q, a) also enables
us to get (q, a) from (p, a), but does not enable us to deduce
(¬p, a) in the presence of (¬q, a). Indeed, (¬q, a) expresses
that N(¬q) ≥ a, which entails N(q) = 0 if a > 0 (since
min(N(q),N(¬q)) = 0 holds). Knowing N(q) = 0, along with
the rule ‘‘N(p) < a or N(q) ≥ a > 0’’ entails N(p) < a, which
differs from the stronger conclusion (¬p, a), i.e. N(¬p) ≥ a,
that may be obtained from (¬p ∨ q, a) and (¬q, a). Moreover
N(p) < a, i.e. ¬(p, a) is not a possibilistic logic formula at the
object level. This shows the deep difference between (¬p∨q, a)
and ¬(p, a) ∨ (q, a), or between ¬(p, a) and (¬p, a).
In the same way, the counterpart of the meta-rule Eq. (11)
writes:
if Π(p) ≥ a, then N(q) ≥ a,
i.e. ¬⟨p, a⟩ ∨ (q, a) where a formula of the form ⟨p, a⟩ encodes
the constraintΠ(p) ≥ a. A hybrid resolution rule [7,8] enables
us to reason from such clauses:
(¬p ∨ q, a); ⟨p ∨ r, b⟩ |H ⟨q ∨ r, b⟩, if b > 1− a.
If one wants to express, as in logic programming with negation
as failure, that:
‘‘r is certain provided that p is certain and that one cannot
establish q’’
it leads to write this rule as:
if N(p) ≥ a, and Π(¬q) ≥ b, then N(r) ≥ a,
which corresponds to formula¬(p, a) ∨ ¬⟨¬q, b⟩ ∨ (r, a).
Automated reasoning in this setting presupposes dealing
with three kinds of information:
– ‘‘facts’’ that are more or less certain, encoded by standard
possibilistic logic formulas of the form (p, a) where p is a
clause and a > 0.
– Possibilistic formulas (q, a) that are ‘‘currently impossible to
establish’’ for any a > 0, which may be expressed under the
form ⟨¬q, 1⟩, since Π(¬q) = 1 is equivalent to N(q) = 0.
Such kinds of statement, which result from a possible lack of
information, may also be propagated bymeans of the hybrid
resolution rule, once they are acknowledged and expressed.
It is clear that the arrival of newpieces of information, which
may enable us to establish new conclusions, may also lead
to delete formulas of the type ⟨¬q, 1⟩ that were previously
accepted.
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¬(p, a) ∨ ¬⟨¬q, 1⟩ ∨ (r, a), which enable us to produce
from the two first types of information, the positive pieces
of information of the form (r, a).
This view raises questions on the links between such a gener-
alized possibilistic logic and on the one hand, possibilistic logic
programming [33,34], and on the other hand, the logical ma-
nipulation of epistemic states in a modal logic style [35], or
with maybe the explicitation of some forms of ‘‘(non) aware-
ness’’ [36]. The following and last section discusses the possi-
bilistic logic interpretation of classical Answer Set Programming
(ASP).
5.3. Answer sets in generalized possibilistic logic
The aim of this section is to summarize how the semantics
of answer set programming can be described in the generalized
possibilistic logic introduced above. Recall that an answer set
program is a set of rules of the following form:
r ← p1, . . . , pn, not q1, . . . , not qm, (15)
with the intuitive meaning that whenever p1, . . . , pn can be
established, we may establish r , unless one of q1, . . . , qm can
be established. Answer sets are consistent sets of literals that
can be derived from a set of such rules using non-deterministic
forward chaining. The non-determinism results from the fact
that when applying a rule such as Relation 15, we need to make
the assumption that neither of q1, . . . , qm will be established
during the forward chaining procedure. An answer-set of the
program, P , is represented by the set of positive literals,A, in this
model (subset of the so-called Herbrand universe H , i.e. the set
of all atoms appearing in P). A model of a rule, like Relation 15,
is then a subset, A ⊆ H , such that A contains r , all pi’s and no
qj’s.
The rule in Relation 15 corresponds to the following formula
in possibilistic logic:
(r, 1) ∨ ¬(p1, 1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬(pn, 1) ∨ ¬⟨¬q1, 1⟩
∨ · · · ∨ ¬⟨¬qm, 1⟩. (16)
In particular, note that a fact of the form ‘‘r ←’’ is translated to
the formula (r, 1). For programs, P , without negation-as-failure
(i.e. m = 0), there is no non-determinism. In such a case,
P has exactly one answer set, A, which is its unique minimal
model, with respect to inclusion (when interpreting the rules
in classical logic, using material implication). In such a case, the
proposed translation into possibilistic logic fully captures the
answer set semantics, as revealed by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let P be an answer set programwithout negation,
and let KP be its translation in generalized possibilistic logic, as
described above. Let A be the unique answer set of P. It holds that:
p ∈ A iff KP |H (p, 1).
Proof (sketch). The proof follows straightforwardly from the
fact that applying the resolution rule to the formulas in KP
corresponds to applying forward chaining. 
The presence of negation-as-failure introduces non-deter-
minism resulting in the fact that program P may have several
answer sets, or none at all. Given a potential answer set, A
(representing an interpretation), checking if it is a model of P
comes down to first computing the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct of
P , with respect to A, denoted PA, and obtained as follows: deletefrom P all rules trivially satisfied by A, that is, rules such that
qj ∈ A, then PA is the set of rules obtained by deleting the
negative part of the body of all remaining rules. The model, A, is
an answer set of P , if A is the unique minimal model of PA.
To encode the answer set semantics in possibilistic logic, we
need to consider two sets of formula: the set KP as before and
a set of assumptions. Indeed, for programs with negation-as-
failure, we face the problem that the possibilistic logic base,
KP , cannot semantically entail any formula of the form ⟨¬q, 1⟩
with a negative literal. Hence the only inferences that can be
made are based on the translation of rules inwhich nonegation-
as-failure occurs. We can now add assumptions of the form
⟨¬q, 1⟩ to KP , meaning that it is consistent to assume ¬q (or
more precisely inconsistent to derive q with certainty). The
non-determinism of the forward chaining procedure is thus
translated in the choice of which assumptions of the form
⟨¬q, 1⟩ to consider. Specifically, for B a set of atoms, we define
MB = {⟨¬q, 1⟩|q ∈ B}. Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Let P be an answer set program. It holds that A is
an answer set of P iff KP ∪ MH\A is consistent and KP ∪ MH\A |H
(p, 1) for all p ∈ A.
Proof (sketch). The fact that for an answer set A of P , it
holds that KP ∪ MH\A is consistent, follows easily from the
fact that KPA ∪ MH\A is consistent, which in turn follows
from Proposition 1 (with PA the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct of P).
Similarly, KP ∪ MH\A |H (p, 1) follows from the observation
that KPA ∪ MH\A |H (p, 1) due to Proposition 1. Conversely, if
KP ∪ MH\A is consistent and KP ∪ MH\A |H (p, 1) for all p ∈ A,
we need to show that A is the answer set of the reduct PA. By
observing that the only inconsistencies that may exist between
disjuncts of KPA and formulas of MH\A are between formulas of
the form (q, 1) and ⟨¬q, 1⟩, it is easy to show that the answer
set A∗ of PA should be such that A ⊆ A∗, using Proposition 1,
and the assumption that KP ∪MH\A |H (p, 1) for all p ∈ A. From
the assumption that KP ∪MH\A is consistent, we, moreover, find
that A∗ ⊆ A. 
Note that condition, KP ∪ MH\A |H (p, 1), alternatively
written as ‘‘KP ∪MH\(A\{p}), is inconsistent for all p ∈ A’’. In other
words, answer sets correspond to maximal sets of assumptions
of the form ⟨¬q, 1⟩, consistent with KP .
In the weighted case, note that for any possibilistic logic
base, K , we either have K |H ⟨q, a⟩ or K |H (¬q, b) for some
b > 1 − a, as ⟨q, a⟩ corresponds to the constraint Π(q) ≥ a,
while (¬q, b) corresponds to Π(q) ≤ 1 − b. This means that
under minimal specificity semantics, adding formulas of the
form ⟨q, a⟩ is either redundant at the semantic level or makes
the resulting possibilistic logic base inconsistent. This suggests
to read ⟨q, a⟩ as ‘‘it is consistent to assume that q is possible (to
degree a)’’. Hence we could look at formulas of the form (p, a)
as expressing knowledge, and at formulas of the form ⟨q, a⟩ as
expressing constraints on what may be derived. Now, assume
thatK is a standard possibilistic logic base and thatK∪{⟨q, a⟩} is
consistent, then K and K ∪ {⟨q, a⟩} are semantically equivalent,
in the sense that they induce the same possibility distribution.
When we consider an expression of the form (p, a) ∨ ¬⟨q, a⟩,
however, the picture changes. In particular, the following two
baseswill typically no longer be equivalent (provided that (q, a)
is not a standard possibilistic consequence of K ):
K ′ = K ∪ {(p, a) ∨ ¬⟨q, a⟩},
K ′′ = K ∪ {⟨q, a⟩} ∪ {(p, a) ∨ ¬⟨q, a⟩}.
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{⟨q, a⟩} ∪ {(p, a) ∨ ¬⟨q, a⟩} |H (p, a).
If (p, a)∪ K |H (¬q, b) for some weight b > 1− a, we thus find
that K ′′ is inconsistent, whereas K ′ may not be.
This apparent paradox can be solved using semantics in
terms of families of possibility distribution. Define π |H (p, a)
if and only if N(p) ≥ a, and π |H ⟨p, a⟩ if, and only if,
Π(p) ≥ a. Rather than identifying a possibilistic knowledge
basewith a single possibility distribution being the least specific
possibility distribution satisfying the imposed constraints, we
may also identify a possibilistic knowledge base with the set
of all possibility distributions that satisfy these constraints. In
other words, we use meta-models [32,35] consisting of sets of
possibility distributions satisfying possibilistic formulas. Under
these extended semantics, it is clear that the set ofmeta-models
of K and the one of K ∪ {⟨q, a⟩} are generally different. In other
words, the above discussion suggests that:
– Generalizing possibilistic logic with more connectives and
modalities requires moving from weighted rules to meta-
rules at the syntactic level (where formulas relate belief
states, rather than only restricting possible worlds), and
moving from a fuzzy set of models (a single possibility
distribution) to a set of fuzzy meta-models, at the semantic
level.
– This seems to be the only way to go in order to capture and
extend answer set programming in the setting of possibility
theory.
6. Conclusion
The article has sketched an overview of the different forms
of if–then rules that can be expressed in the framework of
possibility theory, emphasizing the difference between the
rules that contribute to specify an epistemic state, and the
meta-rules that go from a partial epistemic state to another
partial epistemic state. This distinction has enabled us to bridge
a generalization of possibilistic logic with possibilistic answer
set programming. It is also worth pointing out that the meta-
rules that are based on guaranteed possibility, suggested in
this article for the first time, are still to be studied for a better
understanding of their potential interest. Besides, the idea of
processing approximate reasoning at a symbolic level [37], in
agreement with the idea of computing with words [38], might
be revisited in terms of meta-rules.
Remarkably enough, the theory of approximate reasoning
and possibility theory are not among Zadeh’s most cited
contributions nowadays. This is due to the tremendous success
of fuzzy controllers and the subsequent association between
fuzzy rules and neural networks, which popularized fuzzy
systems in the area of numerical information processing. This
trend, which in some sense questions the linguistic expert-
driven stance of Zadeh’s pioneering work, has also cast some
suspicion on the relevance of symbolic artificial intelligence
whose approachwas presented as being at oddswith fuzzy logic
at large. But from the beginning, Mamdani used to see fuzzy
control as an application of Artificial Intelligence. Moreover,
Zadeh’s approximate reasoning theory, totally neglected by
the neuro-fuzzy tradition, is a fuzzy version of logic-based
AI (possibilistic logic is a particular case of it), and basic
axioms of possibility theory turn out to lie at the core of a
major approach to non-monotonic reasoning [10–12]. These
facts demonstrate that the contributions of Zadeh pioneered
important works quite outside the fuzzy community (whethertheir tenants admit it or not). This short paper suggests
a new bridge between possibility theory and one of the
most popular approaches in symbolic AI to-date: answer-set
programming. This bridge is also related to pioneering texts
of Zadeh concerning ‘‘possibility-qualification’’ of linguistic
statements [3], thus indicating that after 45 years of fuzzy
logic, some contributions by its founder that are currently often
neglected have a good chance to be rediscovered.
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